In What World?

In what world is spending more than the next ten nations combined on defense not enough?  I believe that is the figure we will be at after the coming cuts.  Right now we are spending more than the next 19 countries, only two of which could be called potential adversaries.  After yesterday's strategic guidance announcement, the hand-wringing and incriminations were enough to make me ill.  It started with on the ride into work with LtGen Dave Deptula, Ret, who has now been elevated to the man who designed the air war in Desert Storm, evidently single-handedly.  I do not remember his exact words on NPR, but I believe the sound bite they pulled out was "disastrous."  There were plenty of other hyperbolic epithets thrown around, my favorite of which said something to the effect of "it's all good until there's another Pearl Harbor."  Maybe I am a naif, but I just do not buy any of it.  I think the DoD needs deep, deep cuts if it is to escape the decadence of its ways that a decade of unconstrained spending has brought about.


Another comment I saw said something about the age and number of USAF planes already being on negative trends (older and fewer) before the cuts.  This points to the heart of the problem.  Everything in DoD is getting extravagantly expensive.  From planes to people, the defense inflation rate far outstrips everything else.  This, in part, is behind the idea that strategy is a holy thing and should not be affected by earthly matters such as the budget.  This canard is a defense industry dream, but just doesn't make sense.  Strategy must be informed by what is possible given a nation's resource.  Grand strategy, as a matter of fact, can only be properly formulated with a keen eye on the political economy of a nation.  If it isn't for the economy, there's not much point to strategy.  People talk about amateurs talking strategy while pros talk logistics.  Really, amateurs talk strategy while what really matters is the economy.  With a strong economy and a relatively small, but strong military, you can build up when the writing is on the wall (it isn't now) that you are going to have to face down a peer foe.  That won't happen for some time. With a big army and a crappy economy, that is really a hollow force.

Our interests would be better served with fewer players on our bench.  Would it have been so bad if policy makers looked at the bench in 2003 and said, we really shouldn't do this Iraq thing right now, our bench is sparse, let's do Afghanistan and worry about Iraq later?  I think it would have been ideal.  And if we are facing a threat of clear national, existential danger, then you get everyone out of their bases, get the reserves mobilized, and you go until you git 'er dun, while churning up your economy to back it up and putting more people under arms.  We don't need today a military to take on a peer competitor that may crop up in two or three decades.  We need to maintain the industrial base to a degree, but most importantly, we need to maintain a strong economy so that we have the economy means to spool up later if required.

In the meantime, we need to put the fat, wheezy guy on a diet.  DoD needs to bring its costs down, which the new strategic guidance speaks to explicitly.  Rest assured, though, that this won't be attacked with the vigor it could.  Trust me when I say that most people in the military are extremely well compensated.  The vast majority take a pay cut when they leave service.  This isn't always the case for some junior officers or enlisted with skills overmatched to their military service, but for the rest it is.  We can curb the explosion of compensation and benefits to a degree.  We also need to cut the non-monetary benefits way back.  Service members never need to leave their bases.  They have supermarkets, electronics and department stores, bowling alleys, theaters, great libraries, etc.  We don't need the majority of this.  We need our dining facilities, our gyms, and better transportation into town for the young members so that we can actually interact with the society we defend rather than staying on our bases and looking down on them.  The commissary system grew up when army outposts dotted the frontier.  We don't need them anymore.  Yes, that will increase service members' costs, but do we want a strong defense or a welfare program?  Bandsmen, armed forces sports teams, etc, it all needs to be cut back.  At the same time, we must be more intelligent in our procurement policies, both controlling costs of our weapons systems and being prudent in buying what we actually need.  Do we really need a fleet made entirely of F-35s?  Could we have a reserve of F-35s for high end conflict, with options to crank up the line in a decade or two if it looks like we will need more, focusing more on light attack aircraft and armed UAVs in the mean time?  I think we could.

Imagine what we could do if we turned some of these resources to recapitalizing our aging infrastructure... the infrastructure on which the lifeblood of our economy and our livelihoods flows.  We are diverting resources to unproductive ventures, while real investment is needed to provide the public goods which underpin the economy that will eventually make or break us vis-a-vis the rising world powers.

And on a tangent, does Turkey really need F-35s?  Maybe if we had not seen the F-35 as a one-size-fits-all solution, we could sell them something more appropriate.

I have to cut it short here, but you get the point.  We need real, comprehensive defense reform, not hyperbolic claims that we are being sold out on defense.